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INTRODUCTION
More than ever before, the U.S. justice system is under pressure to
provide competent language interpretation. The U.S. Census Bureau
reported that, as of 2010, approximately forty million foreign-born
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individuals reside in the United States,1 an increase of approximately nine
million over the same population ten years earlier.2 Of those forty million
residents, approximately one in ten spoke no English, while approximately
two in ten did not speak English well.3 Also in 2010, the federal courts saw
a 13.8% increase in the number of annual interpretation events at the district
court level,4 where the court must provide interpreters for all criminal cases
and civil cases brought by the United States.5 Over one-third of those
interpretation events took place in the Ninth Circuit, an area bordering
Mexico and more impacted by nonnative speakers than the majority of the
country.6
This need for language interpretation in our justice system is growing
alongside an uncertainty about the right to confrontation. The Supreme
Court in Crawford v. Washington has labeled as “testimonial” some types
of out-of-court statements, ruling that they are no longer admissible in
criminal cases without the opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine
the declarant.7 Examples of testimonial statements traditionally include
forensic reports, statements made to establish facts, and statements made
during police interrogation.8 Powering the modern understanding of the
Confrontation Clause9 is the Framers’ fear that testimony not subjected to

1

ELIZABETH M. GRIECO ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACS-19, THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2012), available at
http://goo.gl/9MDGDt.
2
See NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION:
2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://goo.gl/x5MQo6.
3
GRIECO ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 fig.12.
4
Interpreting: An Every-Day Event in Federal Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH (May 2011),
http://goo.gl/SE8abR.
5
See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (2006).
6
See Interpreting: An Every-Day Event in Federal Courts, supra note 4.
7
541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). A “declarant” is the source of the original statement. FED. R.
EVID. 801(b).
8
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–14 (2009); Crawford, 541
U.S. at 51–56; see also John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How Crawford v.
Washington Denies Defendants a Consistent Confrontation Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
185, 196 (2011).
9
The Confrontation Clause, embedded within the Sixth Amendment, gives each criminal
defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. For scholarship regarding Crawford’s effect and the boundaries of testimonial
statements broadly, see, for example, Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise
of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (2011); Brooks Holland, Crawford
& Beyond: How Far Have We Traveled from Roberts After All?, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 517
(2012); Grimm, supra note 8, at 196–97.
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“the crucible of cross-examination” may unjustly prejudice a court against a
criminal defendant who should have the right to face his accuser.10
In its 2012 opinion in United States v. Orm Hieng, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized a tricky issue regarding one of those types of
testimonial statements—statements made during police interrogation.11 The
court was faced with an instance in which a police officer testified about
statements made during the interrogation of a defendant who required the
use of an interpreter.12 The trial court granted a motion to exclude
witnesses from the courtroom but allowed the interpreter who assisted in his
police interrogation to remain.13 By doing so, the court implicitly ruled that
the interpreter was “not a percipient or fact witness.”14 On appeal, the
defendant argued that the interpreter’s statements could not be admitted as
evidence if the defendant was refused the opportunity to face the
interpreter.15 One can imagine that the Framers’ fear, which generated the
Confrontation Clause, is especially felt by non-English speaking
defendants, who cannot gain firsthand knowledge of either the statements
their interpreters relay to their questioners during police interrogation or the
statements to which the police officers testify at trial. However, the
majority of the Ninth Circuit panel, relying on its analysis in United States
v. Nazemian,16 found that, so long as the interpreter in question acted as a
mere language conduit, the defendant himself was the declarant of the
statements, and he therefore had no constitutional right to confront his
interpreter.17
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Berzon challenged the
validity of Nazemian’s language conduit test.18 First, Judge Berzon
questioned the “unity between hearsay concepts and Confrontation Clause
analysis” on which the Nazemian holding was founded.19 Second, Judge
Berzon pointed out dissonance between Nazemian’s holding and the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in both Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.20 Based on those two considerations, Judge
10

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012).
12
Id. at 1136–37.
13
Id. at 1137.
14
Id. at 1139.
15
Id. at 1138–39.
16
948 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1991).
17
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1138–41.
18
See id. at 1149 (Berzon, J., concurring).
19
Id.
20
See id. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
11
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Berzon was unwilling to accept silently the majority’s Confrontation Clause
analysis.
The purpose of this Comment is to question Nazemian’s continued
validity based on the two criticisms offered by Judge Berzon’s concurrence
in Orm Hieng. Part I describes the process by which Nazemian’s language
conduit test has allowed the admissibility of statements made through an
interpreter during police interrogation. Part II outlines the current state of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence based on several recent Supreme Court
opinions. Finally, Part III considers both the majority and concurring
analysis of the confrontation issue in Orm Hieng, referencing the evolving
Confrontation Clause doctrine and the development of that doctrine in the
area of forensic report admissibility. By comparing Confrontation Clause
doctrine regarding forensic reports to the issue in Orm Hieng, this
Comment argues that the purpose of police interrogation, the practical
effect of confrontation, and the irrelevance of any perceived quality of
witnesses suggest that police interpreters should be subject to confrontation.
Interpreter confrontation is relevant in a country where over three million
people cannot understand English and where interpreters are used 350,000
times each year in its courts.21 The issue of Nazemian’s continued
application may reemerge in en banc review of a future case.
I. MIRANDA, NAZEMIAN, AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE INTERPRETERS’
STATEMENTS
A. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND POLICE INTERROGATION THROUGH
INTERPRETERS

A suspect of a criminal investigation has the right to refuse to answer
questions during custodial interrogation by police.22 Miranda v. Arizona

21
GRIECO ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 fig.12; Interpreting: An Every-Day Event in
Federal Courts, supra note 4.
22
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. This Comment is limited to cases in
which police interrogation has not violated a defendant’s Miranda rights such that the only
relevant admissibility questions are hearsay and confrontation. For discussion of Miranda
issues as they relate specifically to non-English speakers and interpreters, see Floralynn
Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Diversity, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1999); Richard Rogers et al., Spanish Translations of Miranda Warnings
and the Totality of the Circumstances, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 61 (2009); Alison R. Perez,
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guaranteed that right to criminal suspects by requiring that police employ
specific safeguards before beginning a custodial interrogation: a warning
that the suspect has a right to remain silent; a warning that any statement
the suspect makes may be used against that suspect in court; and a
disclosure that the suspect has a right to a retained or appointed attorney.23
Only upon a waiver of those rights made “voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently” may police obtain statements admissible in court.24
Once a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to
remain silent is made, statements made during interrogation can be used as
evidence against that suspect at trial.25 Typically, the interrogating police
officer enters such evidence as testimony.26 This is the case even when the
interrogation requires an interpreter.27 However, this method of providing
evidence creates a hearsay problem when an interpreter is required. The
Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a person’s oral assertion,
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct . . . intended . . . as an assertion”
made outside of the current tribunal and offered to prove that the assertion
is true.28 Unless such a statement is excluded from or falls within an
exception to the hearsay rule, it is inadmissible in court.29
One exclusion from the hearsay rule provides that a statement made by
a party and offered against that party at trial is not hearsay.30 Based on that
exclusion, statements made by a criminal defendant during police
interrogation are not hearsay because those statements were made by the
defendant and are offered against the defendant at trial.31 When an
interpreter is used in the process of the interrogation, however, the police
officer acting as a witness at trial does not testify about the defendant’s
statements—he testifies about the interpreter’s statements. In that instance,
the hearsay exclusion that allows testimony about statements made during
police interrogation may or may not apply.

Note, Understanding Miranda: Interpreter Rights During Interrogation for Spanish-Speaking
Suspects in Iowa, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 603 (2009).
23
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 455, 469 (1999); see also 23 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §§ 10–17 (2012).
27
See, e.g., United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2012).
28
FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c).
29
FED. R. EVID. 802.
30
See id. 801(d)(2)(A).
31
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 725 F.2d 462, 466–67 (8th Cir. 1984).
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Prior to 2004, there was room to argue that the hearsay problem
created a Confrontation Clause issue as well.32 Before the Supreme Court
altered the Confrontation Clause doctrine with its opinion in Crawford, the
Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause to give criminal defendants the
right to confront any declarant making statements against them by crossexamining that declarant at trial, unless the statements made by that
declarant showed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” or fell
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.”33 Because no hearsay exception
applied to an interpreter’s statements, courts were left with the ambiguous
question of whether the interpreter’s statements showed particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. It was this area of ambiguity that the Ninth
Circuit attempted to resolve with its opinion in United States v. Nazemian.34
B. NAZEMIAN’S SOLUTION TO THE HEARSAY/CONFRONTATION
PROBLEM

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nazemian attempted to clarify the
question of whether statements made by interpreters in police interrogations
qualify as hearsay and are subject to the Confrontation Clause.35 The
defendant in Nazemian was charged with conspiracy to possess heroin with
intent to distribute, among other charges.36 The defendant argued that
statements he made to a DEA agent were inadmissible hearsay and that
admitting the statements violated the Confrontation Clause because a thirdparty interpreter, who did not testify at trial, translated the statements.37
The Ninth Circuit panel identified a threshold question that controlled
both the Confrontation Clause analysis and hearsay analysis: Should the
statements in question be attributed to the interpreter or to the defendant?38
If the defendant were treated as the declarant, the statements would fit into
the same hearsay exclusion as noninterpreted statements during police
investigation.39 Likewise, the Confrontation Clause problem would vanish;
not only would the statements fall within a hearsay exception, but any
defendant interested in confronting the declarant of the statements would

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

See, e.g., United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1991).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).
948 F.2d at 525–26.
Id. at 525–28.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 526.
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have the opportunity to do so, because the declarant would be the defendant
himself.40
The court first analogized to another category of third-party statements
already attributed to criminal defendants—adoptive admissions.41 An
adoptive admission is a statement that a defendant does not make but
manifests that she adopts it or believes it to be true.42 Quoting the Sixth
Circuit, the court explained that adoptive admissions “avoid[] the
confrontation problem because the words of the hearsay become the words
of the defendant.”43 According to the Sixth Circuit, adoptive admission
constitutes a “special indicium of reliability” that removes the need for
confrontation.44
The Ninth Circuit subsequently described two then-current trends in
federal courts grappling with this issue. First, the court referenced several
rulings from other circuits in which they treated interpreters as agents of the
defendants.45 Like adoptive admissions, admissions by an agent of a
defendant fall within an exclusion to the hearsay rule46 and are therefore
attributable directly to the defendant for the purpose of Confrontation
Clause analysis.47 Second, the court referred to rulings where statements
were attributed directly to the defendants by treating the interpreters as
“language conduit[s].”48 Under this language conduit theory, accurate
interpretation by an individual with no motive to mislead or distort does not
create a layer of hearsay.49 Instead, testimony about those statements falls
“within the same exception to the hearsay rule as when a defendant and
another are speaking the same language.”50
The Ninth Circuit then discussed the practical difficulties of adopting a
rule requiring an alternate solution—that in each criminal investigation
requiring a translator, the translator must either be appointed by the court or

40

Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 526.
42
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); see also United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381,
384 (9th Cir. 1983).
43
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526 (quoting Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981)
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
44
Poole, 659 F.2d at 733.
45
See Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526 (citations omitted).
46
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
47
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526.
48
Id. (quoting United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
49
See Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135.
50
United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973).
41

438

JOHN KRACUM

[Vol. 104

provided by the defendant.51 The latter solution might have lent more
credibility to the theory that the translator is an agent of the defendant, but
the court rejected the approach.52 The court voiced a concern about creating
“a largely arbitrary distinction” between criminal defendants based on each
defendant’s language ability and access to a translator.53 The court also
noted that the impact on undercover investigations would be burdensome
on police, whereas translation “in the course of an . . . interrogation
following arrest” could be recorded or achieved by a translator at trial.54
Embracing an approach based on the agency and language conduit
theories,55 the Nazemian court held that the differentiation between
language conduits (interpreters not subject to confrontation) and
interpreter–declarants (interpreters subject to confrontation) must be based
on four relevant factors previously discussed by other circuits.56 First, a
court may consider which party supplied the interpreter.57 Second, the court
may take into account any motivation the interpreter may have had to
distort the conversation or mislead the parties.58 Third, the court may
analyze the interpreter’s language skill along with any qualifications.59
Fourth, the court may investigate whether any acts following the
conversation were consistent with the translated statements.60 When the
relevant factors show that the interpreter acted as an agent of the defendant
or as a language conduit, the defendant may be the declarant of the
interpreted statements.61 Therefore, the statements can generally be
51
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526–27. This potential solution to the translator hearsay
problem came from an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion holding the “agency-language-conduit
theory” to be inapplicable in a case where the translator was a guard at a prison camp at
which the defendant was incarcerated. United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.1
(9th Cir. 1982).
52
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 527 n.7.
55
The Ninth Circuit panel in Orm Hieng explained that Nazemian created the analytical
framework for differentiating between interpreter–declarants and language conduits. See
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2012). However, Nazemian
adopted a hybrid of the agency theory and language conduit theory that predated it.
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527–28 (discussing “factors which may be relevant [to] . . . agency or
conduit theory” and concluding that the district court could have treated the interpreter “as a
mere language conduit or as Nazemian’s agent”).
56
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 528.
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admitted without consideration of the Confrontation Clause or any related
hearsay problem.
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Thirteen years after Nazemian, the Supreme Court reexamined the
Confrontation Clause with the first of a series of cases that has altered that
constitutional landscape. Overturning Ohio v. Roberts,62 the Court in
Crawford v. Washington and its progeny spawned thousands of discussions
based on a criminal defendant’s right to face her accuser.63 The Supreme
Court has used these cases, in part, to divorce Confrontation Clause analysis
from hearsay analysis by no longer making hearsay analysis dispositive of
Confrontation Clause questions. The Supreme Court has also modified the
category of evidence that implicates the Confrontation Clause. The shift in
the connection between the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence
that governs hearsay analysis, as well as the modern application of the
Confrontation Clause to forensic analysis and child testimony, provides
insight to the question of a defendant’s right to confront the interpreter
present at his police interrogation. This Part examines four recent Supreme
Court decisions, starting with Crawford, that shape the area of
constitutional law relevant to Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Orm Hieng.
A. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

The issue in Crawford v. Washington stemmed from the trial court’s
decision to admit the defendant’s wife’s out-of-court statements without
allowing the defendant to confront his wife through cross-examination.64
Prior to the grant of certiorari, courts applied the then-controlling test from
Ohio v. Roberts and reached conflicting opinions regarding the statements’
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause.65 Rather than provide a more
detailed definition of the Roberts test, the Supreme Court reconsidered the
text and the history of the Confrontation Clause.66 That reconsideration

62

448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2003).
As of October 21, 2013, Westlaw lists 36,712 sources that cite Crawford.
64
541 U.S. 36, 38–40 (2004).
65
See id. at 40–41. The State of Washington trial court originally admitted the
testimony. Id. at 40. On appeal, the state appellate court reversed, but that ruling was
reversed again by the Washington State Supreme Court. Id. at 41. Each court tested the
reliability of the statements per Roberts’s instruction but disagreed as to the sufficiency of
the statement’s reliability. Id. at 40–41.
66
Id. at 42–56.
63
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formed the basis of a new test for a defendant’s right to confrontation—an
analysis of the testimonial nature of the statements to be admitted.67
In considering the genesis and history of the Confrontation Clause, the
Supreme Court examined the evils the Sixth Amendment was designed to
confront.68 The Court described the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, an
Englishman convicted of treason on the weight of a damning letter written
by an alleged accomplice.69 The Court also discussed practices in the early
eighteenth century American colonies, where admiralty courts refused
defendants the right to confrontation, a practice that sparked protests from
colonial representatives and defense lawyers alike.70 In addition, the Court
considered the reaction to the Constitution, as it was originally ratified,
without a right to confrontation.71 The Court noted that “the principal evil
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed” was the threat of
convictions based on ex parte evidence—an objectionable judicial practice
that Raleigh described as reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition.72
The Court’s historical analysis led it to two conclusions: first, that
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause must be guided by the desire to
avoid procedures that allow admission of the type of ex parte evidence
admitted against Sir Walter Raleigh; and second, that the evidence thus
barred could only be allowed based on a finding that the declarant was both
unable to testify at trial and had previously been made available for crossexamination.73 The Court expounded on the first of those conclusions in
two ways. The Court first rejected the notion that the law of evidence was
strong enough to protect defendants from the sort of evidence that
compelled the adoption of the Confrontation Clause.74 Instead, the Court
created a new categorization of statements—testimonial and
nontestimonial.75 Although the Court did not directly define these two
67

Id. at 53–54, 59, 68.
Id. at 43–50.
69
Id. at 44. The letter was read at trial, where Raleigh demanded that the author, Lord
Cobham, be brought to face him in public. Id. Raleigh suspected that Cobham would not
be able to repeat the alleged lies that he had written in the letter if he was required to do so in
person in front of a judge and jury. Id. The judges did not allow Raleigh to call Cobham
into court, and Raleigh was sentenced to death. Id.
70
Id. at 47–48.
71
Id. at 48–49.
72
Id. at 49–50.
73
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51, 53–54.
74
Id. at 51 (“Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices.”).
75
Id. at 51, 68.
68
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categories,76 it provided guidelines for lower courts in making the
distinction. Those guidelines included three viable definitions as well as a
list of types of statements that “at a minimum” must be considered to be
testimonial: “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial; and [] police interrogations.”77
The second way the Court expounded on the goal to avoid inquisitorial
procedures was by explicitly rejecting the approach taken by Ohio v.
Roberts.78 The Court determined that the Roberts standard was at once too
broad and too narrow. It applied to both testimonial and nontestimonial
statements but failed to exclude certain testimonial ex parte statements.79
The majority was especially troubled by Roberts’s holding that the
Confrontation Clause could be satisfied by a “mere judicial determination
of reliability.”80 The Court found the Roberts standard to be “amorphous,”
“subjective,” and “unpredictable.”81 Most importantly, the Court was able
to identify a long list of instances in which “statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude” were admitted at trial under
the Roberts test.82 Such a result was unacceptable to the Crawford Court,
and it overruled Roberts.83
Having identified the class of statements to which the Confrontation
Clause was intended to apply and having rejected the Roberts reliability test
as unreliable, the Court affirmed the necessity of cross-examining
testimonial declarants: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one
the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”84 With that concluding
remark, Crawford punctuated its landmark shift from allowing courts to

76

A significant portion of the debate generated by Crawford has been based on the
(in)adequacy of the Court’s definition of testimonial statements. See, e.g., Cicchini, supra
note 9, at 1308–10; Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 273–74 (2005).
77
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
78
Id. at 60.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 62.
81
Id. at 63. The Court stressed the notion of subjectivity by providing examples of
lower court opinions in which “opposite” situations caused those courts to find the
statements more reliable in each case. Id.
82
Id. at 63–65. The majority specifically noted that courts had admitted accomplice
confessions that implicated defendants, plea allocutions acknowledging conspiracies, grand
jury testimony, and prior trial testimony.
83
Id. at 67–69.
84
Id. at 68–69.
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apply hearsay principles and reliability determinations to giving defendants
an immutable right to confront any testimonial declarant.
B. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON

In 2006, the Supreme Court began to refine its definition of testimonial
statements when it granted certiorari to a pair of cases that tested the
testimonial nature of statements made during police interrogation.85 The
resulting decision, Davis v. Washington, altered the Crawford analysis by
establishing the primary purpose test—the notion that the testimonial nature
of a statement may be determined by questioning whether the statement was
made with criminal prosecution in mind.86 Although the Court was careful
not to restrict the definition of “testimonial” to a pure analysis of a
statement’s purpose, Davis began moving the definition away from
Crawford’s original set of unclear potential definitions.
Davis analyzed the admissibility of two conversations related to
domestic abuse cases.87 In the first conversation, Michelle McCottry, the
ex-girlfriend of one defendant, spoke with a 911 operator.88 In the second
conversation, Amy Hammon, the wife of the other defendant, spoke with
police who arrived at her home in response to a domestic disturbance
report.89 Both women’s statements were admitted in state court based on
findings that they were nontestimonial.90 The Davis Court acknowledged
that the nature of both statements was “not as clear” as the statements made
in response to police interrogation in Crawford and set out the following
rule:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.91

85

Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457–59 (Ind. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 976
(2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849–51 (Wash. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 975
(2005).
86
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Rebecca K. Connally,
“Out of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children Even Bear Testimony?, ARMY LAW.,
Mar. 2008, at 1, 13; Christopher Cannon Funk, Note, The Reasonable Child Declarant After
Davis v. Washington, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009); Grimm, supra note 8, at 190–91.
87
547 U.S. at 817, 819.
88
Id. at 817.
89
Id. at 819.
90
Id. at 819, 821.
91
Id. at 822.
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That rule, referred to as the “primary purpose” test, did not limit the
range of testimonial statements to those statements made in response to
police interrogation, but the Court did state in dicta that analysis should
focus on the declarant’s intent when making the statement rather than the
questioner’s purpose.92 Although the primary purpose test helped clarify
the testimonial nature of a limited set of statements, the Davis Court made it
clear that such a test was not an attempt to classify all potential statements
or even all statements made in police interrogations.93 Based on that rule,
the Court held that McCottry’s statement, made during an ongoing
emergency, was nontestimonial and therefore admissible.94 However,
Hammon’s statements were made during an interrogation during which no
such emergency existed.95 Those statements were properly classified as
testimonial and should have been excluded by the trial court.96
The Court also revisited the relationship between the law of evidence
and the Confrontation Clause analysis. Davis considered the potential
cooling effect that a confrontation right could have on potential witnesses—
an especially relevant concern in domestic violence cases, where defendants
can exert significant influence over alleged victims.97 The Court held that
the right to confrontation does not abrogate a defendant’s duty to maintain
“the integrity of the criminal-trial system.”98 The Court refused to
enumerate a standard for the showing of wrongdoing required to
“extinguish[] confrontation claims” but noted a trend in lower courts of
referring to the law of evidence and adopting a preponderance of the
evidence standard.99 Such a use of the law of evidence relative to
Confrontation Clause analysis had been considered and accepted by
Crawford because “it does not purport to be an alternative means of
determining reliability.”100 Davis’s reliance on Crawford’s line between
92

See id. at 822 n.1. Despite the Court’s emphasis on the declarant’s intent, lower courts
responded to Davis’s formulation of the primary purpose test by focusing on the questioner’s
intent in at least one area of law—statements made to police by children who allege sexual
abuse. See Funk, supra note 86, at 940–43 (“In general, if a court decided that the primarypurpose test applied to a child declarant’s statement, the child’s statement would almost
always be testimonial because child abuse victims rarely, if ever, made statements during an
ongoing emergency to law enforcement officials or their agents.”).
93
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
94
Id. at 827–28.
95
Id. at 829–32.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 832–33.
98
Id. at 833.
99
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1878))).
100
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158–59).
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acceptable and unacceptable use of the law of evidence reaffirmed the new
relationship between Confrontation Clause doctrine and hearsay doctrine.
C. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS

Following Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and, finding in favor of the defendant–
appellant, placed limits on the definition of nontestimonial statements.101
The Court held that a forensic analysis prepared as evidence in a criminal
trial is testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.102 In
doing so, Melendez-Diaz limited the rationale that lower courts had used to
hold statements as nontestimonial; specifically, it explicitly rejected several
arguments presented by the State: (1) the analysts were not accusatory and
therefore did not produce testimonial statements; (2) the analysts were not
providing testimony based on past perception and therefore did not produce
testimonial statements; (3) the analysts performed neutral analysis which
could not be classified as testimonial; (4) the reports that were produced
were business records and therefore nontestimonial; and (5) the defendant’s
ability to subpoena the analysts fulfilled the requirements of
confrontation.103 In affirmatively finding the report to be testimonial in
nature and rejecting the arguments for classifying it as nontestimonial, the
Court limited the classification of other nontestimonial statements.
The Court emphatically placed forensic reports “within the ‘core class
of testimonial statements’” that had been developed by Crawford.104 The
Court referred back to Crawford’s inclusion of affidavits in its list of
testimonial statements and determined that the reports “quite plainly” fit the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “affidavits.”105 The Court noted that
the reports were “incontrovertibly a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact’”106 and
described the functional equivalence between the reports and live
testimony.107 Without direct reference to Davis, the Court also discussed
101

557 U.S. 305, 309–11 (2009).
Id. at 308, 310, 329.
103
Id. at 313, 315, 317, 321, 324.
104
Id. at 310 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). Not only was the language of the
Court’s affirmative argument emphatic, but in discussing the various counterarguments
presented by the State, the Court referred to its holding as a “rather straightforward
application of . . . Crawford,” further reinforcing its holding and discounting the State’s
claims. Id. at 312.
105
Id. at 310. The Court made note of the fact that affidavits were mentioned twice by
Crawford when describing categories of testimonial statements. Id.
106
Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
107
Id. at 310–11 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
102
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the purpose of the reports “to provide ‘prima facie evidence’ . . . of the
analyzed substance” and held that, because the purpose of the reports “was
reprinted on the affidavits themselves,” the analysts knew of that purpose,
clearly implicating Davis’s primary purpose test.108
Following its holding that the forensic reports were properly classified
as testimonial, the Court continued by finding the State’s “potpourri” of
arguments unpersuasive.109 The Court first addressed the argument that
there is no constitutional right to confront forensic analysts who “do not
directly accuse [the defendant] of wrongdoing . . . .”110 The Court held that
the Sixth Amendment separates all witnesses into two categories—either
for or against a defendant.111 Because forensic analysts provide evidence
against a criminal defendant, they must fall into the latter category,
regardless of their nonaccusatory nature.112
The State’s second argument was that there is no constitutional right to
confront witnesses who are not “conventional.”113 The Court considered
three ways in which forensic reports may be described as unconventional.114
First, forensic reports are observations made near the time of an analysis,
rather than recollections of past events.115 However, the Court noted that
Davis exercised the right to confrontation based on statements made near
the time of the act being described, discounting the effect of a statement’s
timing on its testimonial nature.116 Second, forensic analysts do not
personally witness a crime or any acts related to a crime.117 The Court
dismissed this distinction as unfounded, using an example of a police
officer providing testimonial statements about a crime scene that had been
investigated.118 Third, forensic reports are not prepared as answers to police
interrogations.119 The Court reiterated its previous holding in both
Crawford and Davis that a statement need not be a response to interrogation
to be testimonial and then pointed out that the forensic reports at issue had
108

Id. at 311 (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 111, § 13 (LexisNexis 2004)).
Id. at 312.
110
Id. at 313.
111
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (contrasting the Confrontation Clause with the
Compulsory Process Clause, which guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses to
support his defense).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 315.
114
Id. at 315–17.
115
Id. at 315.
116
Id. at 316.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
109
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been prepared in response to a police request.120 Not only did the Court
reaffirm the rule that statements not made during interrogation could be
testimonial, but it broadened the concept of interrogation to expressly
include a “response to a police officer’s request to ‘write down what
happened’” as well as a police request for forensic reports.121
The third argument the Court addressed was the claim that forensic
reports should not be subject to the Confrontation Clause because they are
the product of neutral, mechanical testing by people who would not be
inclined to change their opinion if forced to testify in the presence of the
accused.122 The Court rejected both the argument’s premise that the testing
done could be absolutely neutrally and the conclusion that a factor other
than confrontation could weigh on the admissibility of a testimonial
statement.123 The Court considered that the State could “be right that there
are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or verify the
results of a forensic test,” but held firm that “the Constitution guarantees
one way: confrontation.”124 Finally, the Court clearly held that no amount
of reliability could circumvent the right to confrontation when dealing with
testimonial statements. Also, questioning the assumption that the testing
was neutral and reliable, the Court pointed to the use of the Confrontation
Clause in “weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the
incompetent one as well.”125 Although the Court recognized that the
analysts followed standard methods, it identified that “some of that
methodology requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error
that might be explored on cross-examination.”126
The State’s fourth argument was that forensic reports are similar to
business records and therefore are not subject to the Confrontation
Clause.127 Similar to the way it repudiated the previous analysis, the Court
rejected the argument forcefully.128 The Court held that forensic reports,
like police reports, are expressly removed from the category of business
records in the law of evidence because they are created for use in court.129
120

Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 317 (citations omitted).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 317–18.
124
Id. at 318.
125
Id. at 319.
126
Id. at 320 (citing 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 23.03[c], at 532–33 (4th ed. 2007); James M. Shellow, The Application of Daubert
to the Identification of Drugs, 2 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 593, 600 (1995)).
127
Id. at 321.
128
Id. at 321–22.
129
See id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8)).
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The Court then revisited Crawford to reaffirm the separation of
Confrontation Clause analysis and the law of evidence:
Respondent also misunderstands the relationship between the business-and-officialrecords hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause. . . . Business and public
records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under
an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the
administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact at trial—they are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business
or official records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared specifically for use at
petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner . . . .130

By rejecting the use of hearsay exceptions as alternatives to ensuring
reliability through confrontation the Court, as it did in Davis, reaffirmed the
relationship between Confrontation Clause analysis and the law of
evidence.131
The fifth argument the Court addressed was the claim that the
defendant’s ability to subpoena the forensic analysts satisfied the right to
confrontation.132 Here, the Court found that the power to subpoena a
witness does not fulfill the prosecution’s affirmative obligation to present
its witnesses for cross-examination.133
Beyond simply holding that forensic reports are testimonial, MelendezDiaz shaped Confrontation Clause doctrine by limiting the rationale under
which statements can be found to be nontestimonial. Just because a
statement is nonaccusatory, unusual, or supposedly neutral, does not
remove it from the class of statements that require confrontation.134 Instead,
the Court remained focused on the purpose of the statement—whether it
was made to be used against the accused as evidence at trial.135 This
question of purpose guided the Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz, which
ultimately classified forensic reports as testimonial.136
D. BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO

Two years after Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.137 Bullcoming expanded the holding of
Melendez-Diaz by considering the use of surrogate testimony, that is,
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315–17.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 310.
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
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testimony (including cross-examination) from an analyst who was not
directly involved in creating the forensic report being offered, but who was
familiar with the procedure.138 Bullcoming held that the use of surrogate
witnesses removed from the actual analysis did not fulfill the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause.139 Bullcoming also bolstered the Court’s
holding in Melendez-Diaz by rejecting more State arguments for
categorizing the forensic analysis at issue as nontestimonial.140
Bullcoming first expanded the Court’s Confrontation Clause doctrine
by explaining why cross-examining the surrogate witness at issue did not
fulfill the requirement of the Clause.141 The New Mexico Supreme Court
had allowed the surrogate witness to testify in a felony drug case because it
concluded that the analyst only presented the results generated by the
machine used to identify the compound’s component substances and did not
interpret those results or exercise any independent judgment.142 However,
in its review of the analyst’s testimony, the Supreme Court pointed out
remarks about receiving a blood sample, the type of test used and what
procedures were followed by the analyst who performed it, and the lack of
any factor that affected the results of the analysis.143 Rejecting the
suitability of the surrogate witness, the Court analogized the analyst’s report
to a police report recording the address on the door of a house or the speed
that popped up on a radar gun reading, holding that the Confrontation
Clause required more than the availability of any police officer familiar
with the technology and methodology of gathering that information for the
report.144 The Court expressed a specific interest in ensuring the right to
confrontation for the purpose of conveying what the declarant “knew or
observed about the events” that generated the testimony and “expos[ing]
any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”145 In the opinion of the
Court, cross-examining an analyst who had no firsthand knowledge of the
analysis in question could not satisfy the demands of the Confrontation
Clause.146

138

Id. at 2711–12.
Id. at 2713.
140
Id. at 2714–17.
141
Id. at 2714–16.
142
Id. at 2714.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 2714–15.
145
Id. at 2715. The specific language the Court chose, “lapses or lies,” recalls the holding
of Melendez-Diaz, which described “weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the
incompetent one as well.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
146
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713.
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The Court also rejected arguments for classifying the analysis as
nontestimonial.147 Citing Melendez-Diaz, the Court dismissed claims that
the analysis was not necessarily subject to confrontation because it was not
adversarial.148 The Court also rejected an argument that the analysis was
nontestimonial because, unlike the analysis in Melendez-Diaz, it had not
been “sworn to before a notary public.”149 Citing portions of Crawford and
Davis that had foreseen such an argument and rejected it, the Court refused
to accept that the right to confrontation would be so “easily erasable.”150
Relying heavily on Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming was not a drastic
addition to, or departure from, the groundwork that the three cases
discussed previously had laid. However, it did serve to reinforce the
Supreme Court’s stance regarding forensic analysis, and it furthered the
exploration of the testimonial nature of scientific testing by relying on a
rigorous evaluation of the nonmechanical contents of the analysis.
III. ORM HIENG’S ANALYSIS OF POLICE INTERPRETER STATEMENTS’
ADMISSIBILITY
A. MAJORITY’S TREATMENT OF NAZEMIAN POST-CRAWFORD

In Orm Hieng, the Ninth Circuit faced a challenge to Nazemian based
on Crawford and its companion cases.151 The Ninth Circuit panel, in
determining whether Nazemian had been overruled, analyzed whether the
Crawford line of cases had “undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the
prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly
irreconcilable.”152
The three-judge panel first distinguished between the thrust of the
Crawford cases and the holding of Nazemian. The Crawford cases focused
on the testimonial–nontestimonial distinction, where testimonial statements
must be subject to confrontation.153 The threshold determination of to
whom an interpreted statement must be attributed was not directly

147

Id. at 2716–17.
Id.
149
Id. at 2717 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150
Id.
151
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Hieng argues that
Nazemian has been overruled by Crawford v. Washington and its progeny.” (citation
omitted)).
152
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
Id. at 1140.
148
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addressed by any of the Crawford cases.154 Therefore, only if the language
of the Crawford cases made that threshold determination clearly
irreconcilable with current doctrine would the panel have been able to set
Nazemian aside.
The court held that the Crawford cases did not clearly imply that
Nazemian’s threshold determination was invalid.155 The panel conceded
that Nazemian’s test stems from the law of evidence but held that the
Crawford cases “provide no clear guide with respect to the interplay, if any,
between the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence.”156 Although
the panel considered that “Crawford might be read as essentially divorcing
Sixth Amendment analysis from the law of evidence,” it held that based on
repeated references to the law of evidence within Crawford and Davis such
a divorce was not clear enough to find clear irreconcilability.157 According
to the Orm Hieng panel, the standard of clear irreconcilability was too high
a bar for the language of the Crawford court to satisfy.158
B. JUDGE BERZON’S CONCURRENCE

Judge Berzon’s concurrence did not directly attack the majority’s
reasoning, because she agreed that a three-judge panel lacked the
appropriate authority to decide the issue.159 However, the judge’s argument
pressed for en banc review of Nazemian’s continued application postCrawford.160 The Ninth Circuit procedural rules would allow such a review
to confront the Orm Hieng majority’s reasoning with a higher level of
scrutiny than a three-judge panel would bring to bear, changing the analysis
from “clear irreconcilability” to a more searching treatment of preemption
by Crawford doctrine.161
In support and anticipation of en banc review, Judge Berzon offered
two arguments that the Crawford line of cases overruled Nazemian. First,
she briefly alluded to Nazemian’s reliance on “unity between hearsay

154

Id.
Id. at 1141.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 1140–41.
158
Id. at 1139, 1141.
159
Id. at 1145 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“I agree with the opinion’s conclusion that
United States v. Nazemian is not so ‘clearly irreconcilable’ with Crawford v. Washington as
to permit a three-judge panel to overrule Nazemian . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
160
Id.
161
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when sitting en banc, has discretion over the
standard of review it applies. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341
F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2003).
155
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concepts and Confrontation Clause analysis” that was no longer valid.162
Second, she identified tension between Nazemian’s implicit trust in the
accuracy and independence of interpreters and the Crawford cases’ scrutiny
of forensic reports.163 Although neither argument indicated a clear
irreconcilability between Nazemian and the Crawford cases to the panel,
both arguments provide strong support for a future en banc finding that
Nazemian is no longer good law post-Crawford.
1. Nazemian’s Reliance on an Outdated “Unity Between Hearsay Concepts
and Confrontation Clause Analysis”
The argument that Nazemian has been overruled because of its reliance
on an outdated connection between hearsay law and Confrontation Clause
doctrine can be broken into two analytical questions: (1) Was the holding
related to the Confrontation Clause in Nazemian premised on the law of
evidence?; and (2) have the Crawford cases made the Confrontation Clause
independent from whatever evidentiary principles Nazemian relied on, such
that testimony that meets the evidentiary requirements does not necessarily
meet the Confrontation Clause requirements? The nature of the language
suggests that the answer to both questions is yes, and further suggests that
modern Confrontation Clause doctrine is too divorced from the evidentiary
principles that formed the foundation of Nazemian’s holding for the
rationale used in Nazemian to persist as valid law.
a. Nazemian’s Reliance on the Law of Evidence
By adopting agency theory, language conduit theory, and analogizing
to adoptive admissions, Nazemian relies on evidentiary principles. All
three of these doctrines, each of which applied to Confrontation Clause
analysis under Roberts, can be linked to the law of evidence.
Agency theory was one of the two theories that Nazemian explicitly
hybridized into its test to determine the source of interpreted statements.164
Agency theory provides that interpreters are in fact agents of the criminal
defendant being interrogated, so long as the interpreter is capable and has
no reason to falsify a translation.165 Therefore, under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, any of the interpreter’s statements are attributable to the

162
163
164
165

Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1149.
Id.
See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 526–28 (9th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831–32 (2d Cir. 1983).
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defendant and do not qualify as hearsay.166 Although the agency theory did
not form the entire basis of Nazemian’s test, it remains part of the Nazemian
analysis and carries with it a direct connection to evidentiary principles.
Nazemian also adopted the language conduit theory.167 Language
conduit theory is a common law construction that allows a court to attribute
a translated statement to the non-English speaker, rather than the interpreter,
when the interpreter acted only as a “language conduit.”168 Although not
directly connected to the law of evidence, language conduit theory shares
the principles of agency theory and informs courts that adopt agency theory
by allowing them to attribute statements directly to a defendant.169 As with
agency theory, factors related to the interpreter’s reliability play a role in
the determination of whether that interpreter is a language conduit.170 That
language conduit theory was essentially similar to agency theory suggests
that it was at least implicitly connected to the law of evidence.
Nazemian also analogized its holding to the doctrine of adoptive
admission.171 Adoptive admission allows a court to attribute a third-party
statement to a criminal defendant who affirmatively adopted that statement
as her own.172 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such an adoption falls
within the same set of hearsay exclusions that exclude statements by a
party’s agent.173 That attribution then qualifies as a “special indici[um] of
reliability” that obviates the right to confrontation.174 Like Nazemian’s
language conduits, adoptive admission “avoid[s] the confrontation problem
because the words of the hearsay become the words of the defendant.”175
166
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (explaining that statements by a defendant’s agent are
not hearsay).
167
See Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526–28.
168
Language conduit theory stems from a per curiam opinion by the Ninth Circuit that
did not provide a method for differentiating between language conduits and other
interpreters. See United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam).
169
See United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989); Da Silva, 725
F.2d at 832.
170
See Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135.
171
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526.
172
Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981). For example, imagine a
defendant, Smith, is told “your buddy Jones says you two had been watching the bank every
day at 8:00 a.m. for the week leading up to the heist.” If Smith responds, “yeah,” then at
trial the prosecutor may introduce Jones’s statement as Smith’s own statement—not simply
the “yeah” that Smith actually said.
173
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B), (D).
174
Perini, 659 F.2d at 733.
175
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526 (quoting Perini, 659 F.2d at 733) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

2014]

INTERPRETER CONFRONTATION

453

Like agency theory, adoptive admission is directly based on the law of
evidence.
Each of the three principles that formed the basis of Nazemian’s
holding—agency theory, language conduit theory, and adoptive
admission—connect, at least implicitly, to the law of evidence. All three
doctrines conform to hearsay exclusions that attribute third-party statements
to a party involved in the case. The majority in Orm Hieng accepted as
much, saying that “[o]ur threshold inquiry in Nazemian . . . stems from
principles of the law of evidence.”176
b. Crawford’s Separation of Confrontation and Hearsay
Less clear to the Orm Hieng court was the new relationship between
the Confrontation Clause analysis and the law of evidence.177 However, the
language of the Crawford cases strongly suggests that, whatever the exact
relationship between the two may be, the law of evidence as relied upon by
Nazemian should no longer prejudice a defendant’s right to confrontation.
In several instances, Crawford indicated that the relationship between
the law of evidence and the Confrontation Clause analysis that existed
under Roberts needed to change. Crawford “reject[ed] the view that the
[application of the] Confrontation Clause . . . to out-of-court statements
introduced at trial depends upon ‘the law of Evidence for the time
being.’”178 Crawford explained that Roberts’s flaw was its acceptance of
“the vagaries of the rules of evidence” and “amorphous notions of
‘reliability’” in the face of the Constitution’s requirement that defendants be
able to confront testimonial witnesses, and the Court held that no such
doctrine could “be a surrogate means of assessing reliability” of testimonial
statements.179 However, Crawford did not wholly remove the law of
evidence from Confrontation Clause analysis; it held that evidentiary rules
that “[do] not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability”
may still create exceptions to the Confrontation Clause.180
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United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1141 (“[T]he Court’s recent Confrontation Clause cases provide no clear guide
with respect to the interplay, if any, between the Confrontation Clause and the law of
evidence.”).
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004) (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923)) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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This distinction between applicable evidentiary doctrine and
inapplicable doctrine, although not fully examined, has remained valid
through the cases that followed Crawford. Davis reiterated the applicability
of the rule of forfeiture, which is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6).181 Melendez-Diaz separated the general Confrontation Clause
classification of business and public records as nontestimonial statements
from the evidentiary application of business and public record hearsay
exceptions, making it clear that even if the hearsay exception should apply,
such an indication of reliability would not resolve the confrontation issue.182
Based on the Court’s holding that the law of evidence cannot supply
an alternative means of determining a statement’s reliability for the purpose
of Confrontation Clause analysis, Nazemian’s holding is invalid.
Nazemian’s application of the law of evidence is “an alternative means of
determining reliability.”183 Statements admissible under Nazemian are
reliable because an agent of the defendant or a language conduit for the
defendant makes them, allowing the law of evidence to impute the
statement to the defendant. It is only that determination, based on the law
of evidence, which allows courts to impute an interpreter’s statements to a
defendant and avoid the requirement of permitting the defendant to confront
that person. Furthermore, the doctrine to which Nazemian analogized its
holding, adoptive admissions, is used expressly as a method for finding
“special indicia of reliability which would justify an exception to the
requirement of cross-examination.”184 Such indicia could get around the
Confrontation Clause under Roberts, but not so under Crawford. The
evidentiary law rules established by the basis of Nazemian’s Confrontation
Clause analysis thus conflict with the Crawford cases and should be
declared invalid.
2. Tension Between Nazemian and the Treatment of Forensic Reports
Judge Berzon’s next claim relied on a comparison between forensic
analysis and interpretation. Judge Berzon argued:

181
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
The rule of forfeiture denies the right of confrontation to a defendant who wrongly prevents
a witness from appearing at trial. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366–68 (2008).
182
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
183
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
184
Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Translation from one language to another is much less of a science than conducting
laboratory tests, and so much more subject to error and dispute. Without the ability to
confront the person who conducted the translation, a party cannot test the accuracy of
the translation in the manner in which the Confrontation Clause contemplates. 185

Comparing those two disciplines in the context of the Crawford cases
supports the conclusion that defendants should have the right to confront
the interpreters of their statements during police investigation. This is so,
first, because interpretation is conducted both in response to police requests
and for the purpose of gathering evidence against the accused; second,
because confrontation is used to minimize the effect of incompetent and
fraudulent interpreters; and third, because qualities of the interpreter are
irrelevant to showing his reliability.
Both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming made clear that forensic analysis
is subject to the right to confrontation. The Court referenced how affidavits
were included in the list of core testimonial statements,186 how the purpose
of the forensic reports was to establish facts to be used at trial, and how
similar the forensic reports were to live testimony. Like forensic reports,
interpretation for a police interrogation fits into a “core class of testimonial
statements”—police interrogations.187 Also like forensic reports, the
purpose of an interpretation is to establish facts that can be used at trial. In
addition, an interpreter’s statements are exactly what the police officer will
be testifying to at the trial. Based on these three key qualities of interpreter
statements, an interpreter in a police interrogation should be subject to
confrontation.
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming also discussed the importance of
confrontation as a procedural tool that reveals and screens unreliable
witnesses.188 No amount of safeguards within the field of interpretation is
likely to eliminate all possibility of error or misrepresentation, and the
Court, in the Crawford cases, has acknowledged the value that the
Constitution places on face-to-face confrontation as a method of limiting
that danger. Just as confrontation of forensic analysts can “expose any
lapses or lies,” confrontation of interpreters can do the same.189
Finally, the factors that Nazemian relied upon to differentiate between
language conduits and interpreter–declarants, as well as other factors that
185
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may have made lower courts more willing to admit interpreter statements,
have been deemed irrelevant by the Crawford cases. Alternative means of
determining reliability—including considering which party supplied the
interpreter, any motivation the interpreter may have had to distort the
conversation or mislead the parties, the interpreter’s skill along with any
qualifications, and whether any acts following the conversation were
consistent with the translated statements—are all irrelevant under
Crawford.190 Likewise, the perception that an interpreter is nonaccusatory,
unusual, or neutral offers no escape from the Confrontation Clause.191 No
language in the Crawford cases suggests that interpreters should fare any
differently under the Confrontation Clause than do forensic analysts.
CONCLUSION
Non-English-speaking defendants who make statements to police
through an interpreter face a frightening proposition. As the Miranda
warning indicates, anything they say can be used against them. However,
thanks to the language barrier, anything the defendants’ interpreters say,
and not anything the defendants say, ends up being used against them. The
defendant must rely on that interpreter to navigate linguistic and cultural
differences to deliver their words faithfully to the interrogating officer, and
through that officer, to the American justice system.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to be
confronted by the witnesses against them and has been interpreted to grant
the right to confront any testimonial witness, explicitly including third
parties who respond to police interrogations and forensic analysts, among
others. According to the Supreme Court, no indicia of reliability are
enough to deny that right to confrontation so long as the witness’s
statements are testimonial—adverse to the defendant and made for the
purpose of providing evidence at trial. The Ninth Circuit will likely be
faced with a challenge to its twenty-year-old holding in Nazemian that
interpreters need not be subjected to confrontation. The court should take
that opportunity to review the issue en banc and hold that the modern
course of the Confrontation Clause doctrine has invalidated its precedent.
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